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"We  will take as our starting-point the series 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . .  n, n + 1,..., 
and it is this series that we shall mean when we speak of the 'series of 
natural numbers' ." This is Russell's announcement, on the third page 
of  his Introduction to MathematieaIPhilosophy, of his discussion of natural 
numbers. But, he asks, - like many before and since - what are these 
things, the numbers? He gives the 'logicist' reply that they are sets, and 
many have agreed. For  they have seen that, as is well known, arithmetic 
can be modeled in set theory. But not only can arithmetic be modeled in 
set theory. It can be thus modeled in infinitely many different ways. Thus 
different ways of  modeling arithmetic appear to make the number three, 
for example, turn out to be quite different sets. This copious supply of  
models might seem an explicative embarrassment of  riches, and some so 
take it. Thus, Quine maintains, "any progression will serve as a version 
of  number",  with the obvious qualification: "so long and only so long 
as we stick to one and the same progression" (Quine, 1969, p. 45). So 
each natural number may be taken to be a set, though of course a given 
number may not be taken simultaneously to be different sets.1 
It has been maintained, however, that this very profusion of  set- 
theoretic models of  arithmetic makes it impossible to say that numbers 
are sets. Thus Benaeerraf argues that, in brief, since there are infinitely 
many set-theoretic accounts of  what numbers are, all of  which capture 
the notions of arithmetic equally well, there is therefore no good reason 
to say that numbers are sets at all. For, after all, " i f  numbers are sets, 
then they must be particular sets, for each set is some particular set" 
(Benacerraf, 1965, p. 62). 
In the face of  these two roughly opposing views, I should like to try 
a different tack - at least I think that it is a different tack, and that what 
I shall end up saying is distinct from the views of both Quine and 
Benacerraf. 
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Before I begin, however, let me point out some o f  the limits which are 
here imposed, partly by my own prejudices, upon my project. The desire 
to claim that numbers are sets has often historically been tied up with 
the doctrine that mathematics is deducible from logic, and this doctrine 
in turn has been tied up with the doctrine that logic, including set theory, 
is in some way more basic, epistemologically or metaphysically, than 
mathematics. Both of  these doctrines, moreover, have links with the 
view that mathematics is necessary, or knowable a priori, or analytic, 
or all three, and with the desire to show that this is so. I want to make it 
clear at the outset that such doctrines and views are not my concern here. 
The reason is partly that most of  the notions which figure in them are 
not, to my mind, clear or easy to operate with. Thus, for example, I am 
not comfortable with the question whether arithmetic is more or less 
'basic' than set theory. In the second place, however, - and for reasons 
which I cannot hope to expound here - I do not believe that the question 
whether numbers are, say, sets is dependent upon the doctrines and views 
just raised. In particular, I do not believe that the question whether 
natural numbers are sets is affected by the issue of the relative 'basicness' 
of  arithmetic and set theory. If  the issue which I shall discuss seems 
accordingly denuced here of  its usual philosophical covering, I can only 
apologize for its immodesty. 
I I  
I f  the existence of  a model of  arithmetic in set theory was ever a reason 
for identifying numbers with sets, then, I maintain, the existence of  
multiple set-theoretic models of arithmetic should prompt us, not  to 
say with Benacerraf that numbers cannot be sets, but rather to suggest 
that there are multiple full-blown series of  natural numbers. Thus, for 
example, instead of  there being only one three, there are after all many 
threes, and many thirty-sevens, and so on. This suggestion constitutes 
the central theme of  this essay. 
The first step of  the suggestion is to suppose that we can, in our arith- 
metical discourse, replace our numerical singular terms, such as 'three', 
by corresponding atomic general terms, such as 'is a three', or 'threes'. 
Now it might be objected immediately that the suggestion can make no 
sense, on the ground that 'three' and its like are singular terms in English. 
But this objection seems weak. Even if 'three' is taken to be a singular 
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term in English, it seems to me plain that the suggestion does make 
sense - j u s t  as much sense as the claim, which might be made by someone 
who had concluded that the so-called Homeric poems were produced by 
different people, that there turn out to have been several Homers. 
Further support for the intelligibility of such claims (though not an 
explanation of it, which I do not propose to try to provide) is forthcoming 
if we consider Quine's way of eliminating singular terms other than 
variables (Qnine, 1960, pp. 179 ft.). If  his '(~x)(x Socratizes)' is an ac- 
ceptable explication of 'Socrates', then equally '(Tx) (x threes)' would be 
an acceptable explication of the singular term 'three'. But if this is so, 
then it makes sense to ask how many things satisfy the predicates 'x 
threes', and to answer that, after all, many do. 
Postponing for now further issues and objections, let us consider 
further, briefly and informally, what the suggestion itself amounts to. 
I have proposed replacing the putative singular terms '0', '1', '2', 'Y, ..., 
by a set of general terms. The intuitive idea behind the suggestion is that 
to be a three, e.g., is to stand in a certain position (viz., fourth, counting 
zero) in some progression or other. Plainly, what we therefore want is a 
relativized notion of what it is to be a three - relativized, that is, to 
progressions. (This and subsequent relativizations capture the idea which 
Benacerraf expresses when he says that objects do not do the job of 
numbers 'singly'; see his p. 69). Thus what we want to catch are the 
notions expressed by the binary predicates 'x is a zero inp ' ,  'x is a one in 
p',  and so forth, where 'p' ranges over progressions, all the while re- 
cognizing that a given object might stand in a certain position in one 
progression in spite of occupying other positions in other progressions. 
How are we to explain such binary predicates as 'x is a three in p '?  
The idea behind this predicate, we know, is that x stands fourth in p. 
Ordinarily, this idea might be explained by saying that the precursors 
of x in p can be mapped one-to-one onto the numbers (again including 
zero) through two. But remember that we are now attempting to avoid 
using number words as singular terms, and thus we can not remain happy 
with this explanation. Fortunately, however, we can avoid the difficulty 
in a manner originated by Frege. For example, we may explain 'x is a 
zero in p' by saying that there is no precursor of x in p. (Note that in 
putting the point thus I am using a compressed manner of speech: what 
we have to say strictly is that there are no elements of p which precede x 
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in p, since there may of course be elements o f p  which, while they come 
before x in other progressions, do not do so in p.) Then 'x is a one in p' 
can be explained by saying that there is exactly one precursor of x in p, 
which can in turn be explained in familiar fashion by saying that there is 
a precursor, y, of x in p and there is no precursor of x in p which is not 
identical with y. And so forth for all of the binary predicates we need. 
We can then, of course, go on to construct such general terms as '(3p) (x is 
a three in p)'. 
Let me pause briefly in tile account to make a few points. First, my 
suggestion is to be sharply contrasted with Benacerraf's claim, which is 
that numbers are not objects. My view, on the contrary, is that numbers 
are objects, namely objects which occupy positions in progressions, and 
of which such predicates as '(3p) (x is a three in p)' are true. (Ironically, 
however, we shall see that my suggestion might be modified, in a Bena- 
cerrafian spirit, into a denial that numbers are objects.) Second, my 
suggestion is to be distinguished from another quite different view, that 
the number three, e.g., is the set of  all objects which stand fourth in 
some progression or other. This view would not be a happy one, since if 
absolutely any object whatever can be placed fourth in some progression 
or other, then the suggested set would be the universal set, and paradox 
would ensue. (But my suggestion itself will still, later on, have to avoid 
the threat of set-theoretic paradox.) Moreover, aside from worries about 
paradox, such an identification of numbers with sets would be just one 
set-theoretic explanation of number on a par with all of the others, and 
there would be nothing in arithmetic to dictate a choice of it over the 
alternatives. 2 Third, notice that my suggestion seems also to carry a 
certain threat of Pythagoreanism. For if we did say that any object could 
stand in a progression, then my suggestion would seem to imply that 
every object is a number. I shall pursue this pointiater,  where we shall 
find that we can turn it to advantage. 
Given our binary numerical predicates, it is easy to see how the rest 
of the details will work. Statements of pure number theory such as 
'3 + 2 = 5' will emerge as general statements about progressions. Thus 
in this example we end up saying that give any progression, p, the sum 
in p of  a three in p and a two in p is a five in p. Note that I say 'the sum 
in p',  since depending on the progression in which two things are taken, 
their sum can turn out to be quite different objects, standing in quite 
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different positions, and moreover one or both of them will be absent 
from certain progressions. 
This fact in turn reminds us that such arithmetical notions as that of 
'sum' must also be relativized to progressions, so that we can say, e.g., 
'z = the sum of  x and y in p' ,  or for short, 'z = Sum(x, y, p)'. The tradi- 




The sum of  n and 0 is 0, 
The sum of  n and the successor of  m is the successor of the 
sum of  n and m. 
Our analogue of  (2) is: 
(2') (x) (y) (p) ( i fx  is i np  and y is inp, then Sum(x, the successor 
o f y  inp,  p) is identical with the successor inp  of Sum(x, y,p), 
while corresponding to (1) is: 
(1') (x) (y) (p) (if x is a zero in p and y is in p, then Sum(x, y, p) 
is identical with y), 
in the latter of  which we must rely on the explanation just given of 'x is 
a zero in p'.  Other arithmetical notions are similarly tractable. 
Statements of  'applied' number theory can also be straightforwardly 
handled. First of  all, there are statements of  the form 'There are n Fs', 
which will be considered later, where it will be important that they do not 
oblige us to treat numbers as objects - i.e. to quantify over them - at 
all. (Just notice here, however, that our versions of  such terms as 'the 
number of  Fs', when we have occasion to use them, will be different from 
the ordinary, since for us there is no such thing as the number of  Fs, 
but  only 'the number in p of Fs', that is the object, x, in p such that there 
is a correlation of  Fs with the precursors in p of x; but more of  this 
shortly.) Secondly, however, there are statements which do require the 
use of quantifiable variables ranging over numbers. This requirement can 
be escaped in the case of 'There  are as many Fs as Gs' through the render- 
ing of it by 'There is a correlation of  the Fs and the Gs' (though this 
escape leads to no great ontological saving, since we are then required 
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anyway to quantify over relations; cf. Quine, 1960, p. 269). Bat if we 
want to say that there are twice as many Fs as Gs, we should ordinarily 
have to say, e.g., that for some number n (not zero) there is a correlation 
of  the Gs with the numbers less than n, and a correlation of  the Fs with 
the numbers less than the sum of n and n. Our scheme, on the other hand, 
would have us say correspondingly that every progressionp contains some 
element x (not a zero in p)  such that there is a correlation of  the Gs with 
the precursors in p of  x, and a correlation of  the Fs with the precursors 
in p of  the sum in p of  x and x. Other such statements can be treated 
analogously. 
I l l  
The discussion of  the previous section has shown informally how to 
explain our new numerical terms and how to render arithmetical state- 
ments in our new scheme. What the discussion shows is that there is 
nothing in the discourse of  arithmetic itself which requires us to fix on a 
single object, whether set or otherwise, as the number three, e.g., or on 
any single progression as the progression of  natural numbers. As far as 
that discourse is concerned, we may have more threes, and more sequences 
of numbers, than we had thought we had. z 
I propose now to take up some objections which might be raised 
against the view which I have suggested, and to indicate the fines of  
response to them which I would take. In certain cases the indication will 
be sketchy, because some of  the objections introduce issues far too 
broad to be treated fully here. 
Consider first Benacerraf's conclusion, that numbers are not objects. 
Why should my suggestion be preferred to his? In the first place, his 
view appears to have an unnatural feature, namely that he denies that 
numbers are objects while seemingly continuing to use number-words 
and numerals as singular terms. Secondly, he does not tell us very much 
about what his numerical non-objects might be like. In fact, however, I 
cannot rule out apriori the chance that these defects might be remediable, 
and one who is partial to his view can well view my suggestion as pressure 
to produce the remedy. Indeed, my suggestion itself might be used as an 
ingredient. For  one who accepts the construal of  number-words as general 
terms, and who also adopts the Fregean view that general terms denote 
'concepts' (as distinct from 'objects'), might conclude that numbers are 
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concepts in Frege's sense. I might myself adopt this view, but for the 
fact that there seem to me to be difficulties in the Fregean notion of a 
concept. 
The second line of objection will take a little longer. It is easy to sup- 
pose that although many different progressions satisfy the laws of 
arithmetic, there is nevertheless one progression, considered to be the 
sequence of natural numbers, which is specialin that it somehow primarily 
satisfies those laws, and that it is somehow merely mimicked in so doing. 
This supposition seems to me plainly false. As far as merely satisfying 
arithmetical laws is concerned, all progressions are on a par. More 
generally, the point can be put by saying that unintended models of a 
formal system, however unintended they may be, satisfy the system just 
as much as intended models do. 
But even if this much is accepted, the objection may persist that a 
certain single progression is still special, in that it is to members of it 
that we in fact refer when we use numerals or number-words. I find this 
claim dubious too, for reasons which will be familiar and congenial to 
those who are sympathetic with Quine's views on ontological relativity 
(see Quine, 1969, p. 54), since it is unclear to me how we can so confidently 
identify the referents of those arithmetical words. Moreover even if we 
could identify them, it would not therefore be evident that a certain 
progression would be shown to be special in a way which would counter 
my suggestion, or show that there are not, after all and in spite of how we 
have referred heretofore, numerous sequences of numbers. For even if 
we take the references of numerical expressions in our ordinary arith- 
metical discourse to be fixed, the presence of multiple models of arith- 
metic makes us realize that we could equally well have referred dif- 
ferently and still have come out with arithmetical truths. 
Accept even this much, though, and a new version of the objection 
appears, to the effect that regardless of how we might refer, there is still 
a single, special, progression to which we somehow should refer in making 
our arithmetical claims. Though it may be my fault, I have difficulty 
here in following the objection, since I do not see what might support 
this contention. Thus, for example, I do not see how anything about 
arithmetical discourse is explained by singling out a single progression 
as its proper subject-matter. ( 'What about counting?' someone will ask, 
but counting will be taken up shortly.) 
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But the line of objection which I have in mind still has other courses 
which it may take. For instance it might be said that my suggestion errs 
in supposing that the question what numbers are can be answered by 
taking arithmetic as an uninterpreted formal system and asking what 
structures satisfy it. Rather, it could be said, one can answer the question 
only by taking arithmetic as understood, and by somehow reproducing 
its content in terms with the same meaning. Or, in a perhaps similar vein, 
it can be asserted that the approach which I have adopted falls short of 
saying what numbers 'really' are. My view is that this line of thought is 
mistaken, but I obviously cannot settle the point here, since the issue 
is now a broad and deep one regarding the notion of explication in 
general, and regarding the whole project of 'saying what so-and-sos are'. 
Two brief points, however. First, I do not believe that this project need 
or should involve requirements of sameness of meaning. Second, this 
line of argument is not directed exclusively against my suggestion, but 
would be equally cogent, if it is cogent at all, against many accounts of 
number which appeal to only a single progression. 
I might also mention - though again I broach an issue which I shall 
not follow up - that I do not construe my suggestion as 'reducing' num- 
bers to other objects in the sense of denying that there ('really') are 
numbers. On my view, it seems to me, there are indeed numbers, and 
plenty of them. 
Let me now move to a third sort of objection. Our story obliges us to 
quantify over progressions and the objects in them. But what are we 
taking as the range of the variable 'p'? Plainly we must take care, since 
if we say that it is to range over absolutely any and all progressions of 
absolutely any and all objects, then we shall be headed for set-theoretic 
paradox. We must therefore choose some restriction on the range of 'p' 
(along with suitable restriction on the range of 'x', etc.). It is well known, 
however, that no unique choice is forced upon us, and that different 
choices would equally avoid paradox. Thus, we have various choices 
- short of the naive and unrestricted but self-contradictory one - of what 
progressions and elements to say that there are. But, under our account, 
these choices bring with them choices of what so say numbers are. For 
even if two people accept our account so far, they will still disagree over 
what numbers are if they differ in their background views concerning 
what progressions there are. 
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The objection therefore arises to our account that it places us back 
exactly where we started, when we were worrying over the multiple 
models of arithmetic. 4 For  it will be urged that, just as before, we are 
without a fiat identification of numbers with a fixed group of objects, 
but instead have an array of alternatives from which we must select. The 
heir to Benacerraf's argument will then urge us to accept the thesis that 
numbers are not objects. 
Although this objection shows that there is a sense in which we cannot 
claim to have said flatly what numbers are, it does not demonstrate that 
we are back where we began. We cannot say flatly what numbers are 
because we cannot specify a unique correct range for 'p'. What we have, 
rather, is in the nature of a schema for the explanation of  what numbers 
are: that is, we have a way be which anyone, having constructed his 
consistent theory with all of  the progressions which it allows, may explain 
in his own theory what things the numbers are. At the start, by contrast, 
our problem was that even given a consistent background theory with 
some progressions, we still could not make a non-arbitrary choice from 
among alternative accounts of  numbers. We no longer have that problem. 
Our problem now is instead the broader one - which we had on our 
hands anyway - of  deciding how to avoid the paradoxes of naive set 
theory. But relative to a decision on this matter (however arbitrary the 
decision may be), we can now identify the numbers without any additional 
arbitrariness. 
A related objection is to the effect that, since our account can be 
viewed as a reduction of  arithmetic to that part of  set theory dealing 
with progressions, it therefore stands on a par with all of  the other set- 
theoretic accounts of number - notwithstanding the fact that it avoids 
identifying numbers with particular sets. Moreover the objection can 
be bolstered by citing the ontological price which our account exacts, 
since unlike other accounts, ours will standardly involve quantifying over 
progressions. Here again we touch upon broad and deep issues, not to be 
explored here. Suffice it to say that this ontological profligacy can be 
balanced off against a virtue of the account. This virtue lies in its having 
- it seems to me - a certain elegance, and in its ability to help us avoid 
the arbitrariness, just alluded to, of  plumping for one possible identifica- 
tion of  numbers without any very strong reason for doing so. Likewise it 
provides a perspicuous rationale for switches which we may occasionally 
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make, for the sake of technical convenience, from one set-theoretic 
account of number to another, since it enables us to view ourselves, not as 
changing our assumptions about what numbers are, but simply as work- 
ing with a fresh stock of numbers. 
IV  
Counting. Some will argue that it has been wrongly ignored so far, and 
that once it has been adequately treated, there will be no doubt that in 
counting we must use numerical singular terms, and that there is only 
one sequence of natural numbers. This objection can be briefly countered. 
As is well known, statements involving finite cardinalities can be made 
without treating numbers as objects at all, simply by using quantification 
and identity to define numerically definite quantifiers in the manner of 
Frege (see Quine, 1960, p. 268, and recall our use of the same device to 
define our binary numerical predicates). But if we do not need objects 
here at all, we do not need a unique sequence of them either. 5 
Though the argument might end there, there is still some interest in 
the following fact, that even if in one's counting and cardinality-assign- 
ments one uses numerical singular terms, there is nevertheless no need 
to suppose that there is only a single sequence of numbers. Let us briefly 
digress on the matter. 
On a widespread view, counting amounts to a kind of mapping, 
namely certain mappings of sets onto initial segments of the sequence of 
numbers. Suppose that this is so, and it still does not follow that there 
is only one sequence of numbers. We may adapt several points made 
above (in Section III, apropos of the 'second objection'). First, one may 
properly have doubts about how we may identify the referents of the 
terms used in counting, and be sure that they belong to a certain single 
progression. Second, even if we suppose that we in fact use a certain 
progression, we can still recognize that we could have used a different 
one. And not only could that different progression have been used for 
counting various and sundry sets; it could also have been used for count- 
ing segments of the progression which we suppose ourselves actually to 
be using. I see no reason to say that such an operation would not be 
genuine counting, or that anything about counting is explained by the 
idea that it must be performed on a particular instrument. 
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There is a similar contention to be made about a view of Benacerraf 
(pp. 71-72), that "in counting, we do not correlate sets with initial 
segments of  the numbers as extra-linguistic entities, but correlate sets 
with initial segments of the sequence of number words", and that for 
purposes of counting we may perfectly well do without the supposition 
that 'two', '2', 'zwei', and 'deux', all stand for the same object. But while 
he conceives of counting as mapping of sets onto numerical expressions, 
he apparently also thinks that we ought to adopt or view a single such 
string as somehow basic. I doubt that we do so or need to do so. Many 
of us are quite capable of operating with the linguistic sequence '0, 1, 2, . . . '  
or with the linguistic sequence 'zero, one, two .... ', and perhaps with 
others as well. I see no good reason to think that one of these strings of  
expressions is more basic, or that one of  them must be more basic in 
order for us to understand both of them. All that seems to be required 
is that we all be able uniformly and with facility to map each sequence 
onto the other in an order-preserving way. Thus, not only could we use 
different linguistic progressions from any one which we in fact use; we 
actually do use different such progressions on different occasions. 
The point still holds mutatis mutandis if  we switch back to viewing 
counting as a correlating of sets with non-linguistic entities referred to 
by numerical expressions. For  what is impossible about the idea that a 
man could count in this way using either of  two progressions indif- 
ferently, and what would show that one of  them must be basic, to his 
mind or otherwise? 
V 
I remarked earlier that our account might appear to make out that 
everything is a number. Let us see in what sense this might be so. 
This Pythagoreanistic look first comes over our account when we 
consider Benacerraf's remark that any object may (as he puts it) 'play 
the role of', say, the number three, since any object whatever may 
occupy the fourth - or indeed, any - position in some progression or 
other. Thus, we seem to have a staightforward sense in which each object 
is a number: each object is an element in some structure satisfying 
arithmetic. (If  we insist on dealing with counting, we could still say 
'... and is usable for counting' without running afoul of  Benacerraf's 
claim that only certain progressions can be counted with; cf. Note 5.) 
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But the matter must not be taken to be more straightforward than it is. 
It  is not as though we had some single theory in which each object is an 
element in some progression, and we have observed that the hope of  
getting one must be eschewed if we are to avoid paradox. It  is rather 
that even if  an object is not, in a particular theory, ranged in a progres- 
sion, still it could be so ranged in an adjusted theory, provided of course 
- more on this proviso shortly - that we can speak of  the same object 
in more than one theory. 
Keeping this Pythagorean shadow in view, consider now Quine's 
treatment (in Quine, 1966 and 1969) of  the LSwenheim-Skolem theorem, 
which tells us that any theory with a true interpretation has a model in 
the natural numbers (I am dealing here with the sort of theories which 
Quine has in view). What worries Quine about the theorem is Berry's 
suggestion that it leads us to Pythagoreanism, that is, to the conclusion 
that natural numbers are all that there is. My concern with this problem 
here is not with what is often called 'Skolem's paradox', the supposed 
oddity in the fact that non-denumerable models of denumerable theories 
can, as it were, be pared down to denumerable models. Rather, it is with 
the idea that the denumerable models of  theories can be construed as 
models in the natural numbers (Quine, 1969, p. 59), since it is here that 
Pythagoreanism enters in. I suggest that what we have seen so far gives 
us an approach to the LSwenheim-Skolem theorem, and makes its 
attendant Pythagoreanism seem less odd than it might. I f  this is so, then 
so much the better for our account of  number. 
Skolem's 'paradox' aside, what seems so odd about the theorem is 
that it seems to go against our conviction that there are many objects 
which just are not numbers. Now, however, we have a way of looking at 
any object under which it is not unnatural to view it as a number, since 
we know that we could (subject to the proviso noted two paragraphs 
back) place it in a progression which models arithmetic. But we must be 
careful here. The theorem tells us that each object to which a theory can 
be taken to refer may be construed to be a natural number in a structure 
which, as a whole, satisfies that very theory. As we have seen, however, 
our account of number does not say that each object to which a theory 
can be taken to refer must necessarily, within that very theory, be ranged 
in some progression. Nor  - to repeat - does it say that there is a single 
theory within which all objects whatever stand in progressions. Never- 
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theless, it does seem to me that  some o f  the oddity about  the theorem is 
alleviated once we see how each object o f  a theory, so to speak, may  be 
seen, albeit in some other theory, as a number,  that  is, as an element in 
a progression. 
This way  o f  approaching the L6wenheim-Skolem theorem rests, as we 
saw, on the supposi t ion that  the same object can be spoken of  in more  
than one theory. N o w  Quine's discussion of  ontological  relativity and o f  
the inscrutability o f  reference rightly questions this supposition. Does 
this fact cripple this approach  to the philosophical problem raised by 
that  theorem? No,  because the problem itself cannot  be posed without  
the same supposition. In  Quine's terminology, to construe a theory as 
being about  numbers  we must  presuppose bo th  a background  theory and 
a manua l  for  translating into that  background  theory the theory which 
we are examining. (Indeed, this fact is recognized in Quine's own way o f  
'd isarming the problem by means o f  his own doctrine o f  ontological 
relativity, under  which "there is no absolute sense in speaking o f  the 
ontology of  a theory" ;  see his 'Ontological  Relativity',  p. 60.) But like- 
wise that  is all that  is being presupposed when we identify an object, which 
is no t  in one theory ranged in any progression, with an object which is 
so ranged in another  theory. A n d  it would seem arbi trary here to counte- 
nance enough intertheoretic identification o f  objects to generate the 
problem, but  not  enough of  the same sort o f  intertheoretic identification 
to alleviate it. 6 
The University of Michigan 
NOTES 
1 Note in this connection that the claim that any progression satisfies arithmetic is 
different from the claim that any structure satisfying arithmetic is a progression. The 
falsity of this latter claim will not affect my argument. 
z Here I am indebted to Kim. 
8 It seems to me likely that analogous moves can be made in connection with similar 
philosophical problems. 
I should point out that I have said nothing about how naturally or unnaturally the 
above account might fit in with more general accounts of broader classes of numbers. 
On this score, however, I see nothing very threatening. 
4 Here I am indebted to Dreben. 
Let me by the way make explicit a point which has, I think, been somewhat hidden 
in discussion of number and counting. It is that there are two distinguishable though 
related questions a foot: (1) whether a correct account of number requires an account 
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of counting (see Quine, 1960, pp. 262-263, vs. Benacerraf, 1965, p. 51, Note 3, and 
p. 72), and (2) whether a correct account of counting requires talk of numbers as 
objects (Quine, ibid., p. 268). Quine answers both questions in the negative; Bena- 
cerraf's answer to the first is afftrmative, and he makes no explicit response to the 
second (I myself agree with Quine on both). Although the two questions are linked, 
it is important to avoid conflating them. For example it appears to me that such con- 
flation is partially responsible for the mistake in Russell's argument for an aliirmative 
answer to the first question (Russell, 1919, p. 10). 
Benacerraf also believes that any progression usable for counting must have a 
'less than' relation which is recursive, and therefore he believes that some progressions 
cannot do the job of numbers (pp. 51-53). Since I think that we can ignore counting, 
I shall leave this issue aside. However, Benacerraf's restriction on admissable pro- 
gressions could easily be accommodated in what follows. 
e I owe thanks to many, including W. D. Hart, for discussion on the topic of this paper, 
and also to many for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, including Paul Bena- 
cerraf, Burton Dreben, W. V. Quine, and especially Jaegwon Kim. 
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